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What in the World Distinguishes Fiction from
Nonficton Film?
Rigid categories in aesthetics are difficult to defend. How can we distinguish
between blues and rock music, or melodramas and westerns? Paintings can have
sculptural qualities and poems can be musical. To speak of blurred boundaries
between such categories seems perfectly sensible because of the range of
compatible qualitative properties shared in each pairing. Bill Nichols, relying
on the logic of such arguments, contends that the evidential, indexical qualities
of cinematic cameras, when combined with the rhetoric, stylistics, artifice, and
ideologies of narration and film construction, blurs the boundary between fiction
and nonfiction in film:
One of the most blurred of recent boundaries lies precisely between
fiction and nonfiction. When a single idea about the nature of reality, a
common set of shared values and collective pu{pose, does not prevail, a
considerable blurring of previously more sharply maintained boundaries
is in the offing.'
Although the theorist probably most associated with this application of
"blurred boundaries," Nichols is not alone in holding this view. Michael Renov
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states "that all discursive forms - documentary included - are, if not fictional,
at least fictive, this by virtue of their tropic character (their recourse to tropes or
rhetorical figures)."2 Approximately twenty years earlier Christian Metz offered the
more extreme assertion that "Every film is a fiction film" because every film is only
a photographic representation, and therefore an illusion, or fiction, ofpresence.3
Noel Carroll points out that Metz conflates representation and fiction and reduces
all representation to fiction, thereby rendering the term "fiction" useless.a Even
Carl Plantinga, who has done so much to clarify the term "nonfiction," accepts that
"in specific films the distinction between fiction and nonfiction will sometimes be
fuzzy at best," contending that factual indeterminacies and unclear indexing of a
film as fiction or nonfiction can make a film impossible to classify. Nevertheless,
he concludes, "a distinction with fuzzy boundaries is no less a distinction."s If
qualities such as style, rhetoric, ideologies, narrative forms, tropes, or indeterminate
classifications were capable of making nonfiction somewhat fictional, then both the
concepts of fiction and nonfiction would make little sense, and so would attempts
to make sense of the world through nonfiction films.6
Understanding the diverse aesthetic and representational practices utilised
in nonfiction film production (including those shared with fiction film) aids
evaluation of both the production and reception of nonfiction film, as well as the
historical, social, cultural, political, philosophical, and aesthetic significance of
the form. These shared practices do not blur the boundary between fiction and
nonfiction any more than the similarities between the Naus on the March sequence
in Citizen Kane (1941) and newsreels like The March of Time (1935-1951) risk
making the former nonfiction or the latter fiction. Films, whether fiction or
nonfiction, are attempts at human communication. Canoll, challenging the view
that representation necessarily implies subjectivity and fictionalisation, points
out that representations cannot come from nowhere. A film will have camera,
narrative, and authorial points of view, but none of these fictionalise a nonfiction
fi1m.7 Narrative also does not privilege fiction. Peter Lamarque notes that "The
mistake is to treat some particular modes of narrative, notably fictional narrative,
as archetypal. Narrative is not identical with fiction and to classiS a discourse as
narrative has no implications for reference, truth-valuation, or any other kinds of
value."8 Lamarque's focus on reference and truth-value identifies key concerns that
can help to resolve the problem of blurred boundaries. Uncertainty about the nature
ofreality does notjustiS'blurred boundaries, but suggests the need to understand
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better to what nonfrction films refer, how they do so, and the significance of this
distinction between fiction and nonfiction.
My central thesis is that fiction and nonfiction films differ in where objects,
individuals, actions, and events referred to in a film have truth-value.e My approach
is, in principle, simple; I take the negation in "nonfiction" seriously. To do so, an
analysis of fiction must first be offered. Previously I proposed an account of fiction
based on actualist heories of possibility in the metaphysics of modality.l0 I contend
that fictions are representations of stories in fictional worlds. Fictional worlds are
like the possible worlds described in actualist theories of modality, but with the
intentional creation and addition ofalien properties, such as characters, events, or
states of affairs.rrActualism restricts the discussion of possible worlds to the set
of all things that exist.12 Fictional characters and other fictional inventions exist
in our world as cultural artefacts, or as Peter van Inwagen calls them "theoretical
entities of literary criticism," not as the things they are in the stories.r3 A fictional
character is not a possible person. The addition ofthese alien properties, the result
of a fiction-maker's fictive intent, makes the worlds of fiction impossible worlds
because no world can be possible if it contains constituents that are impossible. For
instance, Sherlock Holmes, in the actual world, was bom from Sir Arthur Conan
Doyle's imagination, not biology. Only in fiction does he have biological origins.
His existence as an1'thing other than a character in fictions is therefore necessarily
false, even if an actual person in the real world resembles Holmes. The character
and any such person are numerically and existentially distinct entities.
Fiction films refer directly to the furniture of fictional worlds, and only
allegorically to the real world. By contrast, nonfiction films refer directly to the
fumiture of the actual world. Since the actual world, possible worlds, and what
I will call "naturally occurring impossible worlds" are also composed of the
furniture of the actual world, nonfiction films can refer more broadly to any of
these worlds.la Nonfictional worlds are not produced intentionally, unlike fictional
worlds, but from "maximal consistent setfs] of propositions" about the furniture of
the actual world. Adams calls each set "a world-story."1s The actual world contains
only true propositions, whether they be necessarily or contingently true. Possible
worlds are like the actual world, but contain contingently false propositions.
Impossible worlds are also like the actual world and possible worlds, but contain
at least one necessarily false proposition. Worlds made impossible strictly through
necessarily false or contradictory propositions about the actual world are naturally
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occuffing impossible worlds. Only worlds made impossible by the intentional act
of fiction-making are fictional worlds. All nonfiction worlds relate directly to the
actual world. Fictional worlds, containing alien furniture, cannot refer directly to
the actual world or possible worlds because they could never be those worlds, even
if many propositions in any fictional world are true in the actual world also. The
distinction between the worlds of fiction and nonfiction is a distinction in the actual
world. Since nothing in the actual world can be both what it is and its negation, the
boundary between the worlds of fiction and nonfiction cannot be blurred.
Films are not worlds, but representations of stories within worlds. Being
representations, they need not be accurate, but operate within a framework of tmth-
value. We need to consider not only the metaphysics of fiction and nonfiction, but
also the nature of assertions about them. For instance, consider the statement
(1) The Allies won WWII.
Is this statement true contingently or necessarily? To answer this question, at least
at the level of philosophy, we can analyse it within a possible worlds model. The
statement is true in the actual world. If it is false in at least one possible world, then
the Allies victory was contingent. WWII also features in fictions.
(2) In the fictional worldl the Allies won the war.
(3) In the fictional world/', the Allies did not win the war.
These statements may help us to think about the outcome of WWII, but they are
not about WWII in the same way as sentence (1). Because these fictional worlds
possess alien properties they are not possible. We lack an existential connection
with them. The Allies losing the war in a fiction has a different meaning than the
possibility that the Allies may have actually lost the war. The latter, but not the
former, would change our lives substantially. We can also use this model to look at
other concerns. I presume time travel is impossible. Consequently,
(4) Time travel is possible
is false in all possible worlds. However, time travel exists within fictional worlds
like those of Doctor Who and Star Trek.Thus,
(5) in the fictional worldf, time travel is possible
is true of some fictional worlds. Yet, a filmmaker could defend her or his belief in
the current, actual possibility of time travel. Such a film would be nonfiction, since
it lacks fictive intent, but is equally not factual.
Representations are authorial acts through which a sender of a message
intends a receiver of that message to recognise the sender's intent to convey the
108
meaning of the communication.16 Noel Canoll, Carl Plantinga, and Trevor Ponech
have all offered theories of nonfiction based on speech act theory. Speech act
theory while often discussed within linguistics, need not be limited to linguistics
or language.lT Ponech states that "in producing non-fiction, a communicator uses
some unit of motion picture footage in an effort to assert that something is (or
was, or will be, or could be) the case."l8 He accounts for nonfiction as "cinematic
constatives," atem' he borrows from Kent Bach and Robert Hamish's speech act
theory.le He characterises their understanding of a constative as follows: "my
utterance is an assertion provided that I make it in such away that I try to signal
to the receiver that I wish to elicit his or her credence in what I have said."20
Carroll, Ponech, and Plantinga all rely on an understanding of "nonfiction" as a
negation of fiction, but contend that, while accurate, it produces a result which
is too broad. Ponech explains that "not fiction" will be greater than the set of
cinematic constatives. "So my own model of motion picture non-fictions has
its limitations," he explains, 'osince it is only meant to describe, as broadly as
possibly, the essential pattern - the expression of assertive illocutionary forces
- embodied by a single, albeit major group of nonfictions."2l Ponech notes that
his model does not account for speech acts such as "prohibitives" - such as those
short clips frequently seen just prior to the screening of a feature film prohibiting
acts like the use of mobile phones and recording equipment during the screening.
He offers a reasonably broad understanding of what constitutes nonfiction film,
but maintains that photographic and cinematographic recordings which merely
have a counterfactual relationship with the objects recorded do not, by themselves,
constitute nonfiction films because they lack a speech act. "[D]efining cinematic
non-fiction or stipulating its prototype on the basis of a-rational, mind-independent
indicator relations does not really capture the acfual conditions under which even
surveillance camera footage becomes a work of non-fiction, versus a natural sign
the function of which is more like a thermometer than Drifters."22
While mind-independence is neither a necessary nor sufficient criterion for
nonfiction, Ponech recognises, but glosses over the significance of, such films
being nonfiction. Surveillance footage and actualities say something like "here it
is." Whether, and if so how, such films are cinematic constatives in Ponech's model
is unclear. Such films seem to sit at the periphery of the definition, just as they have
throughout the history of debates about nonfiction in film studies. Carroll goes
further. He defines nonfiction to correspond with films that "belong legitimately
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in the curriculum of courses with titles such as Introduction to the Documentary
Film".In doing so he eliminates such things as "interactive lessons about the way
to draw a flower" and avant-garde films, like Serene Velocity, because they lack
an assertive stance.23 This, though, is a conservative, institutional limitation on the
discussion. It would be reasonable instead to question why the discipline restricts
such works from such courses, especially given the historical constitution of the
discipline through such filters as politics, semiotics, and romantic conceptions of
art and artists.2a Both of Carroll's examples relate directly to real-world concerns
like aesthetics and film itself, in ways that fiction films do not.25
Rather than limit our understanding of nonfiction to conventional boundaries
such as documentary film, evaluating "to what" speech acts in nonfiction
films apply offers an alternative approach to evaluate the scope of nonfiction
representation in film. To some degree this approach already exists. Both Plantinga
and Ponech build into their arguments a broader ontology. Plantinga states:
nonfictions assert a beliefthat given objects, entities, states ofaffairs,
events, or situations actually occur(red) or exist(ed) in the actual world
as portrayed. This distinction between nonfiction and fiction stems
from two forms of discourse found in most societies, corresponding to
two fundamental purposes. On the one hand, we use discourse to make
explicit claims about reality * to inform each other about occurent states
of affairs. On the other, we use discowse to present fictional stories
(consisting of states of affairs that do not actually occur).26
Ponech argues for a wider scope by allowing for the representation of possibilities.
Neither theory explains why assertions about the actual or the possible constitute
the limits of nonfiction speech acts. The scope of Ponech's model comes closest
to the scope of nonfiction I defend here. However, if we wish to understand the
important distinction between the "two forms of discourse" Plantinga raises, we
need a clearer boundary between fiction and nonfiction and a stronger justification
for what separates them. Such a categorisation will encompass a wider range of
films than Carroll, Plantinga or Ponech suggest.
In my view, nonfiction filmmakers refer denotatively and intentionally
to nonfictional worlds.27 Nonfiction representations need not have any further
illocutionary intent beyond asserting correspondence to a nonfiction world. A film
like L'Arrivde d'un train en gare (1895) asserts the existence of a train, a place,
and some people, but says nothing more about them, even if we can interpret
all sorts of significance from the moving image. It is, of course, possible that
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fictional characters or events in a fiction film could be indiscemible from actual
characters and events, but such coincidences do not make the fiction nonfiction,
because the filmmakers did not assert the characters and events were, could be,
could have been, or could not have been so, only that they could be like this.28
Like is the realm of allegory. For a film to be nonfiction, the filmmakers must
assert that the constituent characters, events, and states ofaffairs ofthe film are
numerically identical with the furniture of the actual world. A qualitative identity
locates only similar properties. Charles Foster Kane, for instance, has sufftcient
qualitative correspondence with William Randolph Hearst for Hearst to attempt
to have Citizen Kane shelved. Kane, though, is not Hearst.2e There is no doubt
Citizen Kane is an allegory about Hearst, but it is not a story about him. Citizen
Kane's denotative reference is the events, characters, conversations, etc., ofthe
fiction. The film's meaning, about the influence of such people as Hearst, is a
connotation of the work. Nonfiction filmmakers need only intend that their films
refer to a nonfiction world and assert something about it. Doing so will assert a
view about the actual world by expressing views about the way it is, could be,
could have been, or could not be. Errors in a nonfiction film will not alter its status
as nonfiction, provided the errors do not result from a filmmaker's fictive intent.
Works that lack fictive intent are nonfictional.
Boundaries
I here use the term "nonfiction" to establish the broader category of works
distinguished from fiction. Carroll also identifies this important boundary, but
rather than evaluating its significance, he restricts his analysis to characterising a
more canonical classification. The term "nonfiction", understood as the negation of
fiction, has both descriptive and logical value. It locates the important distinction
of evaluating the world and its modal states directly, rather than allegorically.
In contrast, the term o'documentary" has a strong historical connection to films
with social, political, and ideological concerns, particularly films of the British
Documentary Film Movement, and therefore risks excluding films without an
obvious social purpose. Advocates of direct cinema herald the medium's ability to
document the world indexically via the photographic process. Yet many nonfiction
films include re-enactments, graphic illustrations, models, and animations, which
do not provide indexical evidence.
Gregory Currie argues that documentaries comprise indices of objects and
events composed into intentional communications; hence, a o'documentary"
111
is only one kind of nonfiction fi1m.30 Currie calls these indexical sound and
image recordings "traces" because they have a counterfactual relationship with
the recorded object and are mind-independent. He explains: ooWhen I say that
photography is intention-independent, I mean that in this precise and restricted
sense: the photographer or cinematographer who sets out to record the scene in
front of him will record what is there; the painter with the same intent will paint
what he thinks is there."3r Currie's tight focus on traces brings precision to our
understanding of the production and reception of films that rely on the medium's
evidential capacity. His argument explains, for instance, why "deception," or
'odocumentary malpractice" in the 1999 Carlton Television programme The
Connection created such controversy.32Images allegedly showing male prostitution
and drug trafficking were manufactured. These were not reconstructions, but,
as Brian Winston states, "a public lie."33 Images purported to be evidence were
not. The problem was not that the images were manufactured, but that this genre
of nonfiction establishes audience expectations about evidence which this film
did not meet. Currie does not explain, nor does he intend to, the boundary that
separates nonfiction film from fiction film. Both nonfiction and fiction films have
their genres. Not all films that are nonfiction will be documentaries.
The term "factval" also has undesired meaning. The manufactured sequences
in The Connection do not make the film fictional because the filmmakers aimed
to lie about states of affairs in the real world, not undertake fiction-making. A
lie, as Harry G. Frankfurt reminds us, refers to the real world: "It is impossible
for someone to 1ie unless he thinks he knows the truth."3a A liar "promulgates a
falsehood."3s Being real-world directed, even as a deception about the real world,
a lie is not fiction. Thus, a term like "factual", which implies accuracy, cannot
serve as a descriptive synonym for nonfiction. Illocutions, in any medium, can be
incorrect whether the utterer intends to deceive or simply makes effors. A film can
therefore be both nonfactual and nonfiction. The status ofa representation can also
change. Theories in physics and historical accounts do not become fictional when
disproven; they are just wrong. Films are no different.
Although terms like "documentary" and'ofactual" leave out certain types
of film which are not fiction, and are therefore too restrictive, theorists have
argued that "nonfiction" is too broad. Ponech sections off nonfiction films which
are not cinematic constatives. Carroll excludes avant-garde films, amongst
others. However, a film such as Mothlight (1963), composed of biological matter
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attached to clear leader, printed, and run through a projector, denotatively refers
to objects of the world, and is therefore a document of sorts, but is not what we
would expect in an Introduction to Documentary Film class, even if the terms
"factual" and "documentary" descriptively apply to the film. Yet, Brakhage's films
tend to contemplate things like vision, epistemology, classification, sex, death, the
universe, etc. As PatriciaAufderheide notes, Brakhage himself considered his films
to be documentaries: "I really think my films are documentaries. [...] They are my
attempts to get as accurate a representation of seeing as I possibly Qafl."36 Mothlight
clearly is not fiction Its interests are real-world directed.
The term o'nonfrction," when understood as 'onot fiction," includes a wider
group of films than those typically associated with the term. Such breadth need not
pose a problem. Gregory Currie justifies analysing documentary rather than the
broader categorisation of nonfiction because there is something particular to and
interesting in the practice of assertion through the physical traces photographic
images provide. But we also need to understand how reconstructions, actualities,
surveillance footage, video diaries, cookery programmes and any other direct
assertions about objects, events, and states of affairs represented in moving images
differ from fictional representations in film. The term "nonfiction" describes the
rigid division I wish to illuminate because it points to representations that in some
way express something about the world and its modal states.37
Illustrations
Classifying films as either fiction or nonfiction is by no means a
straightforward endeavour. The examples below illustrate both my argument and
the challenges one faces when attempting such a classification. I have chosen these
examples because they are the types of films that could be argued to justify a
fuzzy boundary befween fiction and nonfiction. Through these examples I aim to
show that any fuzziness rests in aesthetics and verisimilitude, but that these are not
the relevant criteria that distinguish fiction from nonfiction. Of course, any film
could be misclassified by its viewers, and my analyses are as fallible as any others.
I do not intend my argument to provide a schema for classifying films through
interpretation. A film, I contend, is fiction or nonfiction only in virtue of its makets'
intentions.
A film such as All the President's Men (1976) has a very close connection
to reality and, while a fiction, is in many ways factual. Nice Coloured Girls
(1987), in contrast, relies extensively on theatrical sets and invented scenes and
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may appear to be fictional. Yet, the fictional scenes in Nice Coloured Girls do
not evoke the same type of ethical concerns prompted by The Connection, nor do
they make the film itself fictional. Resolutions to these apparent contradictions do
not require the notion of blurred boundaries, but clarity about world references
and the nature of the assertions. Fictional worlds are ontologically complete
within an actualist theory because they begin from the actual world. Fiction-
making involves imagined additions or alterations to the actual world. All the
President's Men,while based closely on Bob Woodward's and Carl Bernstein's
factual account, nevertheless involves fictionalisation in William Goldman's
adaptation, creating specific situations and dialogue and asserting them as true
in the story. Nice Coloured Girls, by contrast, asserts an account of historical and
contemporary relations between Aboriginal women in Australia and white men. Its
direct reference is the actual world. The fictional narrative intercut throughout the
film does not assert the existence ofthese characters or that they said or did certain
things. Rather, it illustrates the film's real-world assertions. Its function could be
compared with something like a medical diagram of, for instance, a human lung.
While not a drawing of any specific, individual lung, the illustration exemplifies
key properties of lungs. Similarly, through the internal narrative in the film, and the
film as a whole, Tracey Moffatt asserts her views about the common properties of
such encounters between Aboriginal women and white men.
2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) and the National Film Board of Canada film
(Jniverse (1960) have a close relationship that prompts comparisons which can
further help us distinguish between fiction and nonfiction. 2001 does not depict
a fictional space journey for its own sake. It presents an allegory that prompts
consideration of humanity as a biological, intelligent, social, and technological
species in the universe. Universe refers to and presents knowledge about our solar
system and universe, as known at the time of production, to prompt some of the
same questions.3s 2001represents space and space travel with a high degree of
accuracy, and generally coheres with knowledge about our universe at the end of
the 1960s. D. B. Jones notes that
NASA ordered at least 300 prints of the film, which they used for training
and for public information. [...] Stanley Kubrick, when he started work
onhis 2001: A Space Odyssey, discussed the project with Colin Low
fUniverse's producer] and hired Wally Gentleman, the wizard who had
achieved the optical effects for Universe, to do the same for Kubrick's
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frlm. And Kubrick used the voice of Douglas Rain, who spoke the
commentary [...] for Universe, as the voice of Hal, the computer.3e
Yet the accuracy Universe portrays, and which inspired Kubrick and his team, does
not rely on photographic evidence. The film makes numerous claims about the
solar system, the universe, and astronomy, but represents this knowledge through
models, animations, and voiceovel (see accompanying still). It offers very limited
photographic evidence that the universe is as presented. The use of models and
animations in Universe serves two purposes. First, they show approximations of
locations that were impossible to photograph prior to 1960 and developments in
NASA s space programme. Second, and more significantly, they point to the core
reference of the film. The film does not simply show the universe; it represents
scientific, philosophical, and historical ideas abotrt the universe and our place
within it. It represents our species as capable of asking, and answering, complex
questions about its existence.
Although constructed for a realist aesthetic, the animations and models
in (Jniverse are generally recognisable for what they are. Aesthetic realism here
does not imply that the filmmakers construct models and animations to emulate
photographic recordings of what the universe looks like. Many of the images and
animated sequences look much like what the film's contemporary audience would
expect the moons, asteroids, and planets in the solar system to look like if they
could have been photographed in 1960. However, the filmmakers take licence
with other sequences, such as the journey beyond our solar system. While such
sequences do not depict what space travel would actually look like, they convey
relevant information without drawing significant attention to the film's formal
construction. In such instances the film narrates, rather than shows. Even Bazin,
who argued so forcefully about film's capacity to record reality, recognised that
realism in film is not the attempt to produce an illusion or copy of reality, but
the establishment of a self-effacing style suited to dramatic and interpretative
possibilities which were previously the domain of the writer.ao
The filmmakers make clear from the beginning of Universe thatthe images
of space in the film represent their contemporary knowledge about space, and
are not to be mistaken for indexical images of space, despite any representational
verisimilitude. Only four minutes into the film the voiceover states: "What
will the first men to leave the earth find? Enough is now known that we can, in
imagination, journey into these spaces" lUniverse,3:55 - 4:121. Many camera
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placements and movements in the film would be impossible if its representations
were restricted to photographic images of real stars, planets, and asteroids. It does
not take sophisticated film literacy to recognise that an image of Jupiter's surface
could not be of the real planet's surface when the voiceover states: "Here, under
the enormous pressure of the atmosphere, a human being would be crushed beyond
recognition" [10:00 - 10:10]. A camera on Jupiter's surface, if the planet has a
surface, would meet the same fate.al In 1960, such a shot was impossible, and
likely still is. Sequences depicting the surfaces ofother celestial bodies, such as
the Moon, Mercury Mars, a moon of Jupiter, and Pluto, show not evidence of these
objects, but illustrations of contemporary astronomical knowledge about them.
The film takes licence with images of space travel, which today may not
stand out as inaccurate representations. The filmmakers provide two animated
sequences that anticipate scientifically erroneous images of space travel common
in fiction film and television: the stargate sequence from 2001 [18:20 - 18:52] and
stars flashing past starships travelling at warp speed in the Star Trek series [22:20
-23:051. Yet even here Universe does not slip into anything resembling fiction.
The stargate-like sequence in Universe presents an imaginary journey through
a corridor of clouds to the edge of the solar system. Neither the animations nor
the voiceovers introduce anything fictional into the film because they provide no
fictional invention or assertion. The film makes no claims about the travel or how it
could be achieved. The phrase'oif we could" makes no claim about anythingactual,
possible, impossible, or fictional 122:27 - 22:511. The voiceover and animation
function jointly as a rhetorical device employed to shift the discussion from the
solar system to interstellar space. In contrast, 2001 builds Universe's corridor of
clouds into the fictional invention of the stargate, while Star Trek makes it true in
the Star Trekftctions that when a ship goes to warp, stars pass like streetlights on
a motorway. The fictions assert these phenomena as true in their fictional worlds.
Universe makes no such assertions.
The problem, though, is how to distinguish between these techniques in
fiction and nonfiction films. The answer rests in the way filmmakers use film to
communicate with an audience.a2 By using sounds and images (including the written
and spoken word), filmmakers express beliefs, thoughts, doubts, and hypotheses
about the world and its modal states. Universe expresses the filmmakers' beliefs
about the nature of our universe, even if the film shows very little photographic
evidence of it. The film's contemporary audiences, during the earliest days of the
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space race, would be well aware that photographers and cameras were not being
dispatched to the planets or to other suns, and would clearly understand that the
images in the film were approximations that describe and illustrate beliefs about
the universe.
The initial sequence of the David Dunlap Observatory shows the observatory
itself. It also shows Dr. Donald MacRae setting up the observatory for an evening's
work [01:24 - 03:491. There is no way to tell merely by watching the film if Dr.
MacRae is routinely setting up the observatory for the evening, or is dramatically
performing this setup for the film. But it does not matter which is correct, since the
filmmakers make no assertion that any particular act of setting up the telescope has
any significance. Rather, whether a genuine sefup or a performance, the sequence
depicts some of the tasks that must be performed, while indexically showing the
observatory itself. Similarly, the sequence about Mars 107:48 - 08:361 shows an
image of the planet's landscape. This image, a shot of a model, provides iconic
imagery of what scientists, and the filmmakers, believed the surface to be like.
Not all sounds and images in the film express beliefs. The o'warp" sequence
in ()niverse, of the journey from the solar system out into interstellar space 122:19
- 23:051, conveys no beliefs or hypotheses about how such a journey could
be undertaken. It shows no ships, only a disembodied view of a journey. The
voiceover asserts that this journey beyond the solar system takes place only in the
imagination: "If we could move with the freedom of a god...." The images in the
sequence provide only a rhetorical device to aid the transition from the solar system
to interstellar space. The sequence that follows asserts beliefs about the nature
of the universe beyond the solar system. In doing so the film also conveys faith
in scientific method - a faith further demonstrated in the observatory sequences
throughout the film. The bracketing of the film with shots of Toronto and the
observatory and the inclusion of sequences depicting a night's observation at the
observatory establishes an overarching question about our place in the universe as
a species capable of contemplating its existence. The variety of illocutionary acts
in (Jniverse expresses knowledge about the universe and exemplifies the complex
means of expression possible in nonfiction film.
To understand a film, its audience must be able to distinguish which
aspects of the representation are relevant to its illocution. Although photographic
representations are indices and can sometimes be used as evidence, they frequently
function most significantly as iconic representations. Flint Schier notes that "iconic
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representations are necessadly selective about what they commit themselves to
depicting."a3 Viewers of a film must be able to identi$ which elements of an iconic
representation have illocutionary force. Incidental inclusions, such as vapour trails
evident in the skies of a western, imply nothing relevant for the interpretation
of the film. Background scenery in an interview may or may not be relevant for
understanding the content of the interview or the expertise of the interviewee.
Shier raises a further, and more obvious example for film. "A black-and-white
photograph is by the nature of its medium simply non-committal about the colour
of the depicted object."aa The absence of colour in Universe asserts nothing about
space itself, although it may be relevant in other ways to the interpretation of the
work. This ability to ignore irrelevant properties of an image and recognise the
relevant properties is simply part of what it is to be a competent reader of images.
There is one way in which a film like Universe is significantly indexical.
The models and animations in the film are intended to convey knowledge about
the universe. Although the images are not indices of the objects they depict, they
maintain an existential bond with the ideas that motivate the construction of the
animation and model sequences in the film. Had the filmmakers'understanding of
the solar system and the wider universe been different, the images would have been
correspondingly different. The film's depictions of various types of star systems
beyond our solar system express beliefs about the existence of these star systems
and the validity of the scientific methods that enabled astronomers to detect the
existence and nature of these star systems 115:29 -22:221.
Ifreference, rather than any prescribed form ofrepresentation, is essential to
nonfiction film, then indexical sounds and images are contingent, and not essential
to the form. Reenactments, models, illustrations, animations, and other forms
of representation, may seem to sit uncomfortably with nonfiction films for two
reasons. First, they have a long and prolific association with fiction, and may,
by convention, seem to be fictional forms. Second, realist theorists of nonfiction
film have privileged the evidential capacity of the photographic image. Bazin
characterises this concern when he contends that the value of a fi1m like Nanook of
the North (1922) rests in the image's ability to show, rather than editing's capacity
to suggest. "What matters to Flaherty, confronted with Nanook hunting the seal,
is the relation between Nanook and the animal; the actual length of the waiting
period. ... [T]he length of the hunt is the very substance of the image, its true
object."as This distinction outlines aesthetic possibilities, but does not suggest a
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definition of nonfiction. Such evidential and existential purity is rarely achieved
in nonfiction film. Even in Nanook the seal hunting sequence was allegedly faked.
Moreover, the sequence has elliptical editing which follows the dramatic principles
of a rescue. We do not see "the actual length of the waiting period," but instead
comprehend the waiting by the drama of the family racing to Nanook's aid. The
value of the sequence is principally iconic. It refers to the type of hardships that
nineteenth century Inuit endured.a6
Similarly, Shipyard (1935), a film from the British Documentary Movement,
narrates the story of the construction of a ship. The film does not intend, however,
to provide a record of the construction of a specific vessel. Paul Rotha aimed to
convey the skill, labour, pride, and hardships of shipbuilding. To achieve this
objective he filmed shipbuilders building two ships to get the desired shots. The
film shows, e.g., what it is like to rivet together the steel plates of a ship, through
the images of people doing so. The film would be significantly diminished, though,
if it were read only as a record of building and launching a ship or two. Shipyard
depicts certain ships and shipbuilders, but does so to represent the dignity of
shipbuilding, the problematic economic dependence such communities have on
shipbuilding, and aspects of the social and cultural existence of mid-1930s British
shipbuilders. We are meant to read the images for their representative likeness,
their iconicity. To read the images otherwise is to miss the social commentary of
the film.
Recognising that nonfiction films rely on iconic resemblance does not
imply that the photographic image's evidential qualities have no role to play.
Many nonfiction films contain images intended to be read as indices because they
provide the evidence through which the film's makers can assert beliefs. Such
images, though, are first and foremost iconic. An image functioning as evidence
serves little purpose if it does not hold some visual resemblance to the profilmic
objects and events that enable recognition. But once this recognition is achieved,
the indexical quality of the image can prove remarkably effective. Night and Fog
(1955) shows ovens, piles of haiq personal effects, and corpses to make evidently
clear that the Nazis carried out their extermination policy. For this film visual,
indexical evidence proves both persuasive and affective. But the film does more
than provide evidence of the Holocaust. These images express attitudes about the
Holocaust which the filmmakers'use to build an argument about complicity.
Beliefs and knowledge are, of course, fallible. Inaccuracies, premised on
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filmmakers' sincere attitudes toward propositional content in their films, do not
render works fictional, nor do they in any way challenge their status as nonfiction,
since these filmmakers were not engaged in fiction making. Universe provides a
clear example of this. The film contains errors. Notably, in the Mars sequence,
the voiceover states "It is reasonably certain that the markings on its surface,
bluish-green in the Martian summer, turning rusty brown in the autumn, indicate
vegetation" [08:03 - 08:16]. Scientist James Lovelock demonstrated only a few
years later that this belief was false. The Viking missions to Mars in the mid 1970s
confirmed Lovelock's conclusion.aT Yet, the film includes an animated illustration
and a voiceover conveying the then current understanding of observational data
about the red planet. It would be wrong to describe the voiceover, the animation, or
their combination as fictional. Facts are simply the way the universe is. Statements
and representations are truthful when they correspond with facts, false when
they do not. Whether true or false, the film's representation of Mars respects the
authority of the factual universe and the prevailing scientific knowledge about
Mars in 1960. This section of the film is inaccurate only because the science on
which it is based was inaccurate.
Film is merely one means among many for human communication. Yet when
it comes to nonfictional representation, film is often presumed to have an obligation
to provide direct evidence of the world's material surface. But the world is also ful1
of ideas, ambitions, aspirations, and imaginations, all beyond the material veneet
of reality and the reach of the camera. Animations, models, and re-enactments
enable filmmakers to refer directly to such aspects of the world, bringing a depth
to nonfiction films difficult to achieve otherwise. By characterising nonfiction as
the logical negation of fiction I aim not just to resolve the paradox of blurred
boundaries that too often haunts discussion of nonfiction film, but also to indicate
what makes nonfiction, and its distinction with fiction, so significant. Nonfiction,
I argue, involves illocutions which have truth-value in the world and its modal
states. Within modal actualism, all possible and impossible worlds are built from
the furniture of the actual world. Fictional worlds, through the inclusion of alien
properties, can never obtain, and are therefore never about the world in the way
nonfictions are. Regardless how accurate or inaccurate a nonfiction film may be, it
is about us and the rich diversitv of existence.a8
C. Paul Sellors
t20
Notes
1 Bill Nichols, Blurred Boundaries; Questions of Meaning in Contemporary Culture (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1994), x.
2 Michael Renov, "Introduction: The Truth About Non-Fiction," in Theorizing Documentary, ed.
Michael Renov (London: Routledge, 1993),7 .
3 Christian Metz, The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema, trans. Celia Britton,
Amwyl Williams, Ben Brewster, and Alfred Guzzetli (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1982), 43-4. This book anthologises essays Metz wrote in the mid 1970s.
4 Noel Carroll, "Fiction, Non-Fiction, and the Film of Presumptive Assertion: A Conceptual
Analysis," in Film Theory and Philosophy, ed. Richard Allen and Murray Smith (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, I 997), 1 76-7.
5 Carl Plantinga, Rhetoric and Representation in Non/iction Film (Grand Rapids, MI: Chapbook
Press, 2010), 24, originally published by Cambridge University Press (1997).
6 Nodl Carroll has argued extensively against "postmodemist" views, including those I mention
here, that collapse fiction and nonfiction, on the one hand, and objectivity and subjectivity on
the other. See his essays "From Real to Reel: Entangled in Nonfiction Film," in Theorizing the
Moving Image (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 224-52; 'Nonfiction Film and
Postmodernist Scepticism," in Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies, eds. David Bordwell
and Nodl Canoll (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 283-306; and "Fiction, Non-
Fiction, and the Film of Presumptive Assertion: A Conceptual Analysis," in Film Theory and
Philosophy, eds. RichardAllen and Murray Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 173-202.
7 Canoll, "From Real to Reel," 227.
8 Peter Lamarque, "On Not Expecting Too Much from Narrative," Mind & Language 19, no. 4
(Aug. 2004):406.
9 Rather than repeat awkward phrases like "objects, individuals, actions, and events" I will
used the term "fumiture" instead. I borrow this term from Robert M. Adams and his theory
of actualism, a theory on which I rely to define both the worlds of fiction and nonfiction. See
Robert M. Adams, "Theories of Actuality," Nons 8 Q974):211-31.
10 See my essays "A Realist Account of Fiction," Film and Philosophy 10 (2006): 51-66; and
"The Impossibility of Science Fiction: Against Buckland's Possible Worlds," Screen 42, no.2
(Summer 2000): 203-16.
1 1 'Alien' is David Lewis'term. See his On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), l-2.
12 See Alvin Plantinga, "Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism,"
Philosophical Perspectives I (1987): 189-231; andAdams "Theories ofActuality."
13 Peter van Inwagen, Ontology, IdentiQ and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 44. See also Amie L. Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphysics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). I discuss these views in my essay "A Realist
Account of Fiction."
14 Actualists tend not to discuss impossibiliry presumably because any world-story that has
necessarily false propositions will not be obtainable, and is therefore irrelevant for understanding
possibility and necessity, which the theory aims to illuminate. Nevertheless, impossible worlds,
while perhaps irelevant for the metaphysics of modality, are relevant for discussions about
fiction and nonfiction film, as I aim to demonstrate.
15 Adams, "Theories of Actuality," 225.
16 I discuss intention and authorship in detail in Film Authorship: Auteurs and Other Myths
(London: Wallflower Press, 2010) and "Collective Authorship in Film," Journal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism 65, no.3 (Summer 2007):263-71.
l7 See Carroll, "Fiction, Non-Fiction, and the Film of Presumptive Assertion"; Carl Plantinga "What
a Documentary is After A11," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63, no.2 (Spring 2005):
105-17; Carl Plantinga, "Moving Pictures and the Rhetoric of Nonfiction: Two Approaches,"
in Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies, eds. David Bordwell and NoEl Carroll (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 307-24; Carl Plantinga, Rhetoric and Representation
in Nonfiction Film (Grand Rapids, MI: Chapbook Press, 2010); and Trevor Ponech "What is
Non-Fiction Cinema," in Film Theory and Philosophy, eds. Richard Allen and Murray Smith
t2l
l 8
t 9
20
2 l
22
L )
1 A
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 203-20.
Ponech, "What is Non-Fiction Cinema," 204.
Ponech, "What is Non-Fiction Cinema," 207-9.
Ponech, "What is Non-Fiction Cinema," 207.
Ponech, "What is Non-Fiction Cinema," 209.
Ponech, "What is Non-Fiction Cinema," 205.
Canoll, "Fiction, Non-Fiction, and the Film of Presumptive Assertion," 174-5.
Seminal histories of nonfiction frequently distinguish recordings, such as actualities, from a
more canonical understanding of the term. Richard Meran Barsam, for instance, locates the
beginning of nonfiction with Nanook of the North (1922), while Erik Bamouw sees actualities
as a preliminary step towards documentary: "The aura of prophecy surrounds much of the work
of this first documentary period. It foreshadows the many potential roles of a documentary film
maker" (29). See Richard Meran Barsam, Nonfiction Film: A Critical History (London: George
Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1974), and Erik Barnouw, Documentary: A History of the Non-Fiction
Film, revised edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).
I do not intend this comment to be taken too critically, but as somewhat symptomatic of the
otherwise very important studies I discuss here. Shifting debates about nonfiction from vague
notions of art and indexicality to speech actS already produces a valuable reconceptualisation
of nonfiction film. Canoll, Plantinga, and Ponech re-evaluate and challenge historical
understandings in film studies. Subsequently, I am surprisedthatthis valuable reconceptualisation
of theory is not accompanied by a robust reconsideration of the historical categorisation of
nonfiction films.
25
26 Plantinga, Rhetoric and Representation in Nonficton Film, 18.
27 An anonymous reviewer of this paper rightly points out that filmmaking involves more than
one intention: "to teach, to persuade the audience of a certain point of view, to give aesthetic
pleasure, etc." Such plurality of intention will, as the reviewer notes, make some films difficult
to classifr, and certainly some filmmakers will intend to make their films diffrcult to classif for
aesthetic and/or semantic purposes. However, in making a film a filmmaker will have a view
if he or she has a fictive intent. Vewers'difficulties classifring a film does not make the film
other than it is. Whiie I am interested in elaborating here the distinction between fiction and
nonfiction, the reviewer is right to assert that, as experienced, film cannot be reduced to a single
distinction. I am grateful to the reviewer for this comment.
28 The impossibility of a fictional character differs from something not being possible of a person.
29 This distinction betvveen numerical and qualitative identity is certainly not unproblematic within
the philosophies ofmodality and identity. See Harold Noonan, "Identity," Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, last modified November 7 , 2009, accessed June 29 2013, http://plato.stanford.
eduientries/identity/. However, in the current discussion I avoid these problems because my
argument relies only on the filmmakers' assertions. For example, Drew and his colleagues assert
numerical identity between the John F. Kennedy in Primary (1960) and the John F. Kennedy
who sought the US Democratic Party presidential nomination at that time. Arguments about
numerical identity in philosophies of modality and identity consider all properties. Assertions
about fictional and nonfictional representations can concern only relevant properties. A re-
enactment, for instance, will not reproduce identical physical properties. However, filmmakers
constructing and including re-enactments in films do not assert anything more than iconic
resemblance to the characters. events. and states ofaffairs.
30 See Gregory Currie, "Visible Traces: Documentary and the Content of Photogtaphs," Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 57, no. 3 (Summer 1999):285-97 . Currie revised and republished
this work as "Documentary," in Arts and Minds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 63-83.
31 Currie, "Documentary," 66.
32 Currie, "Documentary," 69.
33 Brian Winston, "Making Connections: The European Convention on Human Rights, The
Independent Television Commission and the Documentary" in From Grierson to the Docu-
Soap: Breaking the Boundaries, eds. John Izod, Richard Kilbom, and Matthew Hibberd (Luton:
University of Luton Press, 2000), 209.
r22
34 Harry G. Frankfurt, On Bullshit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 55.
35 Frankfut, On Bullshit,46.
36 Stan Brakhage quoted in Patricia Aufderheide, Documentary Film: A Very Short Introduction
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 63.
37 I do not suggest that the terms "documentary" and "factual" should be abandoned, or only applied
restrictively when they descriptively identif, specific films. Nor do I suggest that "nonfiction"
is a preferable term in general discussion. We use all of these terms unproblematically as
something like proper names, rather than descriptions. Analytical debates treating these terms
as descriptions clariff concepts, but need not determine colloquial usage. Equally, colloquial
usage and conceptual imprecision should not be held as equivalent to analyical clarity.
38 Universe is available on the NFB website (http://www.nfb.calfilm/universei). In this essay I
provide timings for relevant clips rather than stills from the film.
39 D. B. Jones, "The Canadian Film Board Unit B," in New Challenges for Documentary, edited
by Alan Rosenthall (London: University of Califomia Press, 1988), 136.
40 Andrd Bazin, "The Evolution of Film Language," inWhat is Cinema, vol. 1, ed. and trans. Hugh
Gray (London: University of Califomia Press, 1967), 23-40.
4l At present we do not know if Jupiter has a solid core. Also, this sequence [ 09:1 3 - I 0:1 0] notes
12 moons of Jupiter. At present we are aware of 50 moons and 14 provisional moons orbiting
Jupiter. See NASA s website "Solar System Exploration: Jupiter," last modified Apr1l26, 2013,
accessed Iune29,2013, http://solarsystem.nasa.gov/planets/profile.cfrn?Object:Jupiter.
42 I argue extensively for an intentionalist account of film authorship in "Collective Authorship
in Film," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 65, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 263-71 and Film
Authorship: Auteurs and Other Myths (London: Wallflower Press, 2010).
43 Flint Schier, Deeper into Pictures: An Essay on Pictorial Representation (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986), i64.
44 Schier, Deeper into Pictures: An Essay on Pictorial Representation, 164.
45 Bazin, "The Evolution of Film Language," 27.
46 Bazin may have had the walrus hunt in mind instead. It includes long takes of waiting and
of landing the catch (provided the jump cuts in the Criterion Collection edition indicate lost
footage, rather than elliptical editing). Nevertheless, the sequence retains a dramatic shape
through editing and framing, including the struggle to land the walrus and the wahus' "mate"
attempting to rescue its stricken partner.
47 Nova,"Goddess of the Earth," aired January 28, 1986, PBS, WGBH Boston.
48 I would like to thank Giorgio Bertellini and Fergus Robb for their discussions on the topic of this
paper and the joumal's anonymous reviewers for their asfute comments.
t23
